Monday, September 28, 2009

What is defamation?
Defamation is a public communication that tends to injure the reputation of another. It includes both libel (written defamatory statements) and slander (oral ones). The definition of defamation varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but “there is common agreement that a communication that is merely unflattering, annoying, irksome, or embarrassing, or that hurts only the plaintiff’s feelings, is not actionable.” Cf. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd, 1 All E.R. 1011, 1015 (H.L. 1993) Test: whether “‘what has been published . . . would tend in the minds of people of ordinary sense to bring the plaintiff into contempt, hatred, or ridicule or to injure his character. Other common tests include: “‘lowering the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking people generally,’ ‘injuring the plaintiff’s reputation by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule,’ and ‘tending to make the plaintiff be shunned and avoided.’” Torlley vs Fry [1930] 1 KB 479 Greer LJ stated that, “words are not defamatory, however much they may damage a man in the eyes of a section of the community, unless they amount to disparagement of his reputation in the eyes of right- thinking even generally. To write or say of a man something that will not affect his reputation in the eyes of the average right- thinking person is not actionable within the law of defamation. If the words only tend to bring the plaintiff into odium ridicule or contempt with a particular class or society they are not defamatory”. See also a) Dr. Kamanyire vs The Editor-in- Chief, The New Vision [1990]1 KALR 134 b) Namuyigga Nabbowa vs The New Vision Printing and Publishing Corporation & Anor. HCCS No 226 of 2003 The case for defamation, the plaintiff has to prove to the satisfaction of court that he/she suffered reduction in her reputation or esteem in as far as the right thinking members of society were concerned by adducing evidence from her colleagues or from members of society who knew the plaintiff before the publication of the words complained of. See, David Etuket & Another vs The New Vision, HCCS No 86 of 1996 The question whether the words are capable of conveying a defamatory meaning is a question of law and is therefore, one calling for the judge’s decision ( See Shah vs Uganda Argus (1971)EZ 362 at 365. Rationale of the law of Defamation, ancient times: UK Parliament in passing Scandalum Magnatum, in 1275 wanted to prevent insults to the nation’s “best men” because it feared threats to the feudal order a concern that uncontrolled criticism would drive qualified individuals out of public service. Second, the government, then the Crown, wanted to stifle critics who threatened its legitimacy. In that era, the challenge came from those who rejected the idea that the king was ordained by God. What is the relationship between the law of defamation and freedom of speech. By making some public statements unlawful, however, defamation law runs counter to another widely accepted legal tenet—the right to freedom of expression. Constitutions drafted from the eighteenth century to the present contain provisions that guarantee free speech within states. On the international level, treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, protect the right to free expression. Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Justification for free speech; First, open discussion creates a “marketplace of ideas,” in which ideas compete in the public sphere until truth emerges. Second, “intelligent self-government” requires free speech because citizens need to understand and debate matters of public concern. Third, people can only experience true autonomy and self-fulfillment if they are allowed to express themselves; thus free expression represents an end in itself. Freedom of speech can also be considered a fundamental right, which in turn helps protect other rights. If people can speak freely, they can assert their rights openly and protest any infringements. Locus to sue in defamation. Who can sue? In Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1993), the House of Lords ruled that the common law does not allow a local authority to maintain an action for libel. The County Council had tried to sue the Sunday Times and its staff for two articles questioning council investments and management of a superannuation fund. Because the council is elected, Lord Keith of Kinkel wrote, it “should be open to uninhibited public criticism. The threat of a civil action for defamation must inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech. The Indian Supreme Court followed Derbyshire’s lead one year later in R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N. (1994)6 S.C.C 632 (India).It found that “the Government, local authority and other organs and institutions exercising power” cannot bring a defamation suit for damages. Going a step farther, this court also ruled that because public officials do not have a right to privacy, they cannot seek damages for statements that discuss their official conduct. The courts present a threefold rationale for restricting the government’s ability to sue. · First, criticism of the government is vital to the success of a democracy, and defamation suits only serve to chill free debate. Derbyshire emphasized this point when distinguishing the county council, a governmental and democratically elected body, from other types of corporations, which can sue if defamation damages their business. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd · Second, defamation laws are designed to protect reputation, which some courts argue a government body cannot have. Because elected bodies regularly change membership, Lord Keith explained, “it is difficult to say the local authority as such has any reputation of its own. Reputation in the eyes of the public is more likely to attach itself to the controlling political party, and with a change in that party the reputation itself will change.” · Finally, political action offers a better means for the government to defend itself from harsh criticism. Allowing the state to sue some critics opens the door to unlimited suits against others. Such suits also represent an inappropriate use of a state’s wealth; the government should not use taxpayers’ money to stifle their right to freedom of expression. Defences to Defamation Fair Comment The defense of fair comment offers protection for the expression of opinions. The court does not need to agree with the opinion; instead, it must determine “whether the views could honestly have been held by a fair-minded person on facts known at the time.” Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1010, 1015–17 (H.L. 1999) While it may be easier to argue fair comment than to justify facts, the defense does not cover all opinions. Defendants must prove their opinions were based on facts and made for the public interest; the latter requirement is not too difficult to meet unless the defamation deals with the private life of someone who is not a public figure. Defendants do not need to prove they honestly held the opinion, only that a reasonable person could hold such an opinion. Unlike justification, fair comment can be defeated if the plaintiff proves the defamer acted maliciously. In order to pass the test for proving the defense of fair comment, the allegation must be: (1) a comment or opinion, (2) fair, i.e., based on some foundation, (3) based on true facts, (4) a matter of public interest, and (5) based on facts stated clearly in the publication Previlege Privilege—absolute or qualified—is designed to protect expression made for the public good. Absolute privilege offers a complete defense for people “with a public duty to speak out.” For example, elected officials may speak freely in Parliament; judges, lawyers, and witnesses cannot be sued for what they say in court; certain government officials are not liable for reports about matters of state. Without such a defense, the threat of defamation suits would deter these people from speaking freely and the public interest would suffer. Qualified privilege provides protection to expression made in the public interest unless statements are made with malice. It requires “reciprocity of interest” between the person who makes a comment and the person who receives it. The defense applies to people with a social or moral duty to report information, such as the occurrence of a crime, and to authorities who have a duty “to receive and act upon” communications or complaint In Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1999), the court refused to establish a general privilege for the publication of “political information.” Reynolds, who had just resigned as the Prime Minister of Ireland, claimed the Sunday Times had falsely accused him of withholding information and “deliberately and dishonestly” misleading the Irish House of Representatives and his coalition cabinet. The newspaper argued that it was in the public interest to print the story. The court discussed many of the cases analyzed in this section, but limited its decision to qualified privilege and ruled against the Times. Recognizing the value of free expression, however, the court somewhat modified the common law and emphasized the need to view the situation “with today’s eyes.” Reynolds replaced the traditional requirement of reciprocity with a “circumstances test,” which a judge may use to decide if privilege is appropriate in a particular case. To determine if “the public was entitled to know the particular information,” the judge will consider many factors, including the seriousness of the allegation, the nature and source of the information, efforts made to verify the information, and the urgency and tone of the article. Such a test offers the possibility, but no guarantee, of privilege for the press; the court found the Times’ story too one-sided

Law of Torts- Nuisance

NUISANCE Under the common law, persons in possession of real property (either land owners or tenants) are entitled to the quiet enjoyment of their lands. If a neighbor interferes with that quiet enjoyment, either by creating smells, sounds, pollution or any other hazard that extends past the boundaries of the property, the affected party may make a claim in nuisance. It is closely concerned with “protection of the environment’. Nuisances come in two forms: private and public. Public Nuisance A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the public's right to property. It includes conduct that interferes with public health, safety, peace or convenience. The unreasonableness may be evidenced by statute or by the nature of the act, including how long and how bad the effects of the activity may be. In Gillingham Borough council vs Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd & Others (1991) Buckley J stated that public nuisance is primarily concerned with the effect of the act complained of (as opposed to its inherent lawfulness or unlawfulness) to the sufficient number of the public. No civil action can be brought by a private individual for public nuisance. The reason normally given is that it prevents multiplicity of actions. The Attorney General may bring an action for an injunction (‘relator action’). However, where any person is injured in some way peculiar to himself ie if he can show that he has suffered some special or particular loss over and above the ordinary inconvenience or annoyance suffered by the public at large, then he may sue in tort For the distinction between public and private nuisance see, · Sedleigh-Denfield Vs O’Callaghan [1940] A.C 880 at 905,907,918 · Arima Nantongo & Others vs Hiral Mohammed [1974] E.A 557; [1975] HCB 21 · Arima Nantongo & Anor vs Hiral Mohammed [1974] HCB 181 · Tindarwesire vs Kabale Town Council [1980] HCB 33 · Kitamirike vs Mutagubya [1965] EA 401 · Gillingham Borough Council vs Medway Dock Co Ltd [1992]3 ALLER 923 And those already cited on your reading list. Private Nuisance A private nuisance is simply a violation of one's use of quiet enjoyment of land. It does not include trespass. Private nuisance traditionally was, and is still is confined to invasions of the interest in the use and enjoyment of land, although occasionally an occupier may recover for incidental injuries sustained by him in exercise of an interest in land. Justice Lugayizi in Dr. Bwogi Richard Kanyerezi vs The management Committee Rubaga Girls School, High Court Civil appeal No.3 of 1996 quoting Winfield on tort 8th Edition pp 353-367 stated that “a nuisance is private where it exclusively affects a private person and not a sizeable number of the community where it occurs. The learned author of the said book described a nuisance as an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land. Such interference in essence being either a continuous or recurrent nature and usually stenches and smoke would qualify under that description. Whether a nuisance is actionable or not will depend upon a variety of considerations especially the character of the defendant’s conduct and the balancing of conflicting interests ( ie the right of the defendant to enjoy his property as he wishes as against the right of his neighbuors to enjoy theirs without interference)” In Cunard v Antifyre Ltd, 1933] 1 KB 551 Talbot J, at p 557, succinctly defined private nuisances as interferences by owners or occupiers of property with the use or enjoyment of neighbouring property. “Property” here means land, and should be amplified to include rights over it, or in connection with it. Any affected property owner has standing to sue for a private nuisance. If a nuisance is widespread enough, but yet has a public purpose, it is often treated at law as a public nuisance. Owners of interests in real property (whether owners, lessors, or holders of an easement or other interest) have standing only to bring private nuisance suits. Elements of private nuisance i. The plaintiff must possess proprietary interest ii. The act complained of should be unlawful iii. There must be an overt act (act causing the nuisance) iv. The plaintiff must also prove that nuisance emanated from the defendant’s property v. The interference must be both substantial and unreasonable In Watt vs Jamieson (1954) Lord President Cooper stated that “if any person so uses his property as to occasion serious disturbance or substantial inconvenience to his neighbor’s property, it is in general case irrelevant as a defence to plead merely that he was making a normal and familiar use of his own property. The balance in all such cases has to be held between the freedom of a proprietor to use his property as he pleases and the duty on a proprietor not to inflict material loss or inconvenience on adjoining proprietors or adjoining property That private nuisance is an invention of the plaintiff’s interest or right in possession and enjoyment of land. Scot L.J in Read vs Lyons & Co. Ltd [1945]K.B 216 at p.236 defined private nuisance as unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land or some right over, or in connection with it. The essence of nuisance is a state of affairs that is either continuous or recurrent, a condition or activity which unduly interferes with the use or enjoyment of land See also; · Lord Goddard C.J’s judgment in Howard vs Walker 1947] 2 ALLER 197 at 199 Thus the plaintiff must have possessory/ proprietary interest in order to sue in nuisance. Nuisance is thus complementary to trespass which protects his related interest in exclusive possession. The distinction is that trespass applies only to physical intrusions by tangible objects or things whereas nuisance extends also to invasions by noise, smell, vibrations and even high frequency interference with television screens. See, John Fleming; Law of Torts, 6th Ed. 1983, pg 384-386 Reasonableness Reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct “according to the ordinary usage of mankind living in … a particular society”, per Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield Vs O’Callaghan [1940] A.C 880 at 903. Reasonableness signifies what is legally right between the parties taking into account of all circumstances of the case. After balancing the competing interests of the parties, the court considers whether the interference was excessive by any standards. The fact that the defendant took all reasonable care and reduced it to a minimum provides no defence. Lord Wright further stated that, a balance has to be maintained between the right of the occupier to do what he likes with his own and the right of his neighbour not to be interfered with. It is impossible to give any precise or universal formula, but it may broadly be said that a useful test is perhaps what is reasonable according to the ordinary usages of mankind living in society, or, more correctly, in a particular society · See also ;Rapier vs London Tramways Co. [1893] 2 Ch. 588 It is not every noise, smell or dust that irritates your neighbor that will constitute nuisance. Bramell B. in Bamford vs Turney (1862) 3 B.& S 66, he stated that nuisance is premised on the protection of such interests with an attempt to balance the competing interests or rights of neighbors a rule of ‘give and take’. That liability is imposed only in those cases where harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be required to bear under the circumstances However, in determining whether the defendant’s action is unreasonable certain considerations have to be borne in mind; a) The extent of the harm and the nature of the locality. In the case of St. Helen’s Smelting Co. vs Tipping (1865)11 H.LC 642. Weir, Casebook, 4th Ed. P. 344, Lord Westbury L.C stated that, “if a man lives in a town, it is necessary that he should subject himself to the consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on in his immediate locality, which are necessary for trade and commerce, and also for enjoyment of property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants of the town and of the public at large” Therefore, interference which may be permissible in one area may not be permissible in another. See, Andrea vs Selfridge & co [1938] Ch.1 As such, most jurisdictions now have a system of land use planning (e.g. zoning) that describes what activities are acceptable in a given location. Zoning generally overrules nuisance. For example, if a factory is operating in an industrial zone, neighbours in the neighbouring residential zone cannot make a claim in nuisance. Jurisdictions without zoning laws essentially leave land use to be determined by the laws concerning nuisance. Veale J in Halsey vs Esso Petroleum Co [1961]1 W.L.R 683 stated that the magnitude of the harm and in some cases the nature of the locality are circumstances to be considered in determining whether the defendant has acted unreasonably. The law does not regard trifling inconveniences; everything is to be looked at from a reasonable point of view b) Utility of the defendant’s conduct Since nuisance is the law of give and take the court is inevitably concerned to some extent with the utility or general benefit to the community of the defendant’s activity. c) Abnormal sensitivity In considering what is reasonable the law does not take account of abnormal sensitivity in either persons or property. The standard of deciding whether a particular use of land exposes others to an unreasonable interference is objective, in the sense that it has regard to reactions of normal persons in the locality, not to the idiosyncrasies of the particular plaintiff. Read · Relay vs Yorkshire Electricity Board [1965] Ch.436 · Mombasa Auto Services vs South British Insurance Co. [1950] 17 EACA 72 In the case of Robinson vs Kilvert (1889) 41 CH.D 88, the defendant began a manufacture paper-boxes in the cellar of a house the upper part of which was in occupation of the plaintiff. The defendant’s business required hot and dry air and he heated the cellar accordingly. This raised temperature on the plaintiff’s floor and dried and diminished the value of brown paper which the plaintiff warehoused there; but it did not inconvenience the plaintiff’s workmen nor would it have injured paper generally. It was held that the defendant was not liable in nuisance. That “a man who carries on an exceptionally delicate trade cannot complain because it is injured by his neighbor doing something lawful on his property, if it is something which would not injure anything but exceptionally delicate trade”. Rylands vs Fletcher Principle is quite distinct from Nuisance since it relates only to cases where there has been some special use of property bringing with it increased danger to others, and does not extend to damage caused to adjoining land owners as a result of the ordinary use of the land. See, Richards vs Lothian at p. 180 and Sedleigh-Denfield Vs O’Callaghan [1940] A.C 880(Viscount Maugham’s judgment) Who can sue in private nuisance? See; Thompson Swab vs Ostak [1956] WLR 335 That the general principle is that title is the basis for an action in nuisance. Lord Goff stated that, the essence of the law of nuisance is about real property. Thus a person with no interest in land has no right of occupancy and cannot sustain an action in nuisance. A person who has merely the use of the land without either the possession of it or any other proprietary interest in it eg a mere licensee on the land, a lodger, or a guest cannot sustain an action in nuisance. See, Hunter vs Canary Wharf Ltd 1997] 2 WLR 684, a person with exclusive possession of the land. Lord Wright in Sedleigh-Denfield Vs O’Callaghan [1940] A.C 880 at 902-903 stated that “He alone has a lawful claim who has suffered an invasion of some proprietary or other interest in land” That the ground of responsibility is the possession and control of the land from which the nuisance proceeds. Who can be sued? a) The creator of the nuisance Whether or not he is in occupation of the land on which nuisance originates and it is no defence that the land is now occupied by someone else and that he has no power to abate the nuisance without committing trespass.Creation may be construed to include continuing nuisance when you should have abated it if in occupation of the premises where it originates. In Sedleigh-Denfield Vs O’Callaghan, Lord Atkin stated that, “In the context in which it is used,“continued” must indicate mere passive continuance. If a man uses on premises something which he finds there, and which itself causes a nuisance by noise, vibration, smell or fumes, he is himself, in continuing to bring into existence the noise, vibration, smell or fumes, causing a nuisance. Continuing, in this sense, and causing are the same thing. It seems to me clear that, if a man permits an offensive thing on his premises to continue to offend—that is, if he knows that it is operating offensively, is able to prevent it, and omits to prevent it—he is permitting the nuisance to continue. In other words, he is continuing it” Read · Southport Corporation vs Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd [1956] A.C 218,225, · Hall vs Beckenham Corporation [1949] 1.K.B 716,728 b) The occupier, The occupier of the premises where nuisance exists is in general liable during the period of his occupancy. It is simple where he himself created the nuisance, but further questions arise where it originated (i) with someone lawfully on the premises; or (ii) with a trespasser or as a result of an act of God; or (iii) with someone from whom the occupier acquired the property. Rowlatt J in the Division Court summaries this liability in Noble v Harrison([1926] All ER Rep at p 287;[1926] 2 KB at p 338): The damage there was caused by an overhanging tree with a latent defect and the decision was against liability. His Lordship stated that; ”… a person is liable for a nuisance constituted by the state of his property (i) if he causes it;(ii) if by neglect of some duty he allows it to arise; and (iii) if, when it has arisen without his own act or default, he omits to remedy it within a reasonable time after he did or ought to have become aware of it.” It will be seen that the learned judge in the third category makes no distinction according to whether the “nuisance” is caused by trespassers or by natural causes, and that he does not enter into any question as to the limits of the effort or expenditure required of the occupier. As a general statement of the law it was cited with apparent approval by Dixon J in Torette House Proprietary Ltd v Berkman ((1940), 62 CLR 637 at p 652). In 1940 the dictum of Scrutton LJ ([1924] 1 KB at pp 357, 358) passed into the law of England when it was approved by the House of Lords in Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan. It establishes the occupier’s liability with regard to a hazard created on his land by a trespasser, of which he has knowledge, when he fails to take reasonable steps to remove it. It was clear in that case that the hazard could have been removed by what Viscount Maugham ([1940] 3 All ER at p 359;[1940] AC at p 895) described as the “very simple step” of placing a grid in the proper place. This statement of the law has been adopted in Salmond’s Law of Torts (5th Edn)(1920) pp 258–265: “When a nuisance has been created by the act of a trespasser or otherwise without the act, authority, or permission of the occupier, the occupier is not responsible for that nuisance unless, with knowledge or means of knowledge of its existence, he suffers it to continue without taking reasonably prompt and efficient means for its abatement.” if the occupier “adopts” or “continues” the nuisance, he will be liable if damage is caused. This is the view taken of the decision in Barker v Herbert[1911] 2 KB 633. Vaughan Williams LJ, at p 640,said that, to impose a liability upon the possessor of land in such a case, there must be either the creation of a nuisance by him or a continuance by him of a nuisance. Fletcher Moulton LJ in Salsbury vs Woodland [1970] 1 Q.B 324 said, at pp 642, 643: “In a case where the nuisance is created by the act of a trespasser, it is done without the permission of the owner and against his will, and he cannot in any sense be said to have caused the nuisance; but the law recognises that there may be a continuance by him of the nuisance. In that case the gravamen is the continuance of the nuisance, and not the original causing of it”. He added that the knowledge of servants and agents for whom the owner is responsible must be attributed to him, and that cases might arise in which his or their want of knowledge might be due to neglect of duty. Read, · Salsbury vs Woodland [1970] 1 Q.B 324 , · Matania vs National Provisional Bank [1938] 2 ALLER 633, · Sedleigh-Denfield vs o’Callaghan [1940] A.C 880 c) The landlord The general rule is that a landlord is not liable for nuisance on the premises, as he is not in occupation; the proper person to sue is the tenant. However, the landlord may be liable, (i) If he has authorized nuisance (ii) If he knew of nuisance before letting. (iii) If he ought to have known of nuisance before letting (iv) Where the landlord reserves right to enter and repair or has implied right to do so. Read, · Goldman vs Hangrave [1967] 1 A.C 645 · Leakey vs National Trust [1980] Q. 485 · Defences 1. Legislative authority/statutory authority Where the alleged nuisance was caused by public authority acting under a statutory power, the defendant may have this defence that the conduct is permitted by statute. However, this defence will depend on the construction of the particular statute in question. In Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd vs Greater London Council [1983] 1 ALLER 1159, [1983] 2 AC 509, Lord Templeman summarized this defence that, “it is now well settled that where parliament by express direction or by necessary implication has authorized the construction and use of the undertaking or works, that carries with it an authority to do what is authorized with immunity from action based on nuisance. The right of ation is taken away… To this, there is made the qualification, or condition, that the statutory powers are exercised without negligence..” His Lordship further stated that one of the reasons for this approach is that parliament is presumed to have considered the interests of those who will be affected by the undertaking or works and decided that the benefits from those outweigh any necessary adverse side effects See, · Marriage vs East Suffolk River Catchment Board [1950] 1 K.B 284 · A.G vs Ivan Eriya Kafeero Nambule [1959] E.A 665 · Allen vs Gulf Refining Ltd [1981] 1 ALLER 353,[1981] AC 1001 2. Planning permission · Lord Templeman in Tate & Lyle Industries Ltd vs Greater London Council [1983] 1 ALLER 1159, [1983] 2 AC 509, stressed that the principle underlying the defence of statutory authority should be extended to planning permission. That parliament set up a statutory framework and delegated the task of balancing the interests of the community against those of individuals and of holding scales between individuals to the local planning authority. There is a right to object to any proposed grant, provisions for appeals and inquiries. There is an added safeguard for judicial review. If a planning authority grants permission for a particular construction or use in its area it is almost certain that some local inhabitants will be prejudiced in quite enjoyment of their properties. “Can they defeat the scheme by bringing an action for nuisance? If not why?” Planning permission is not a license to commit nuisance and a planning authority has no jurisdiction to authorize nuisance. However, a planning authority can, through its development plans and decisions, alter the character of a neighbourhood. This may have an effect of rendering innocent activities which, prior to the change, would have been an actionable nuisance. See Allen vs Gulf Refining Ltd [179] 3 ALLER1008 at 1020 ,[1980] QB 156 at 174-175 per Cummimng-Bruce LJ, quoted with approval on appeal. 3. Prescription A privilege to commit a private nuisance may be acquired by prescription, if it would qualify as an easement See, Hulley v Silversprings Bleaching co. [1922] 2 Ch.268 4. Consent of the plaintiff see; Kiddle vs City Business Properties Ltd [1942] 1 K.B 269, Miller vs Jackson [1977] Q.B 966 5. Common benefit. Read Bamford vs Turner (1862) 3B& S 66 (judgment of Bramwell B). His Lordship questioned such a defence that if an act that causes nuisance is for public benefit, the plaintiff cannot recover. That whenever a thing is for public benefit as properly understood- the loss to the individuals of the public who lose will bear compensation out of the gains of those who gain. See also St. Helen’s Smelting Co. vs Tipping (1865) QB 66 6. Inevitable accident, see; Southport Corporation vs Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd [1956] A.C 218 at 226 7. Default of the plaintiff Read; East S.A Telegraph Co. Ltd vs Cape town Tramways Companies Ltd [1902] A.C 381 at 393.

STRICT LIABILITY

THE RULE IN RYLANDS VS FLETCHER Ø Identify the purpose, relevance and application of the rule Ø What is the rule about? Ø What is its relationship with other aspects of the law of negligence and nuisance? Ø Limitations of the rule (why other jurisdictions have abandoned the rule. Ø What are the defences under this rule? Background; The case of Rylands vs Fletcher [1866] LR 1 Ex 265 established the principle of strict liability for loss arising out of escape. In that case, the John Rylands employed independent contractors to build a reservoir on his land he was renting. Thomas Fletcher operated mines in the area and had tunneled up to old disused mines. During construction of the reservoir the contractor stumbled on mine shafts which connected to the plaintiff’s. When the mine was filed with water, it flooded to Rylands mines causing damage to Ryland’s mine. Rylands sued the defendant in negligence. The case went through four courts of increasing status. The Liverpool Court found in favour of the plaintiff Fletcher on the basis of trespass and nuisance. Rylands successfully gained an order for the matter to be heard by the Court of Exchequer of three judges. That the decision was based on trespass requiring direct human involvement in the invasion of an interest (quiet enjoyment of land), which required intent or negligence, and Rylands had been engaged in a reasonable and lawful act, with no ill-intent or negligence, and there was no nuisance as there was nothing offensive to the senses about water. Fetcher took the matter to the Court of Appeal being the Exchequer Chamber of Six judges. The decision was overturned in favour of the appellant Fletcher. Delivering the judgment of court, Blackburn .J stated the legal position that, “We think the true rule of law is, that a person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape”. This became a starting point of a new species of liability arising from damage to land available through the tort of cattle trespass, nuisance, as well as the in scienter action, injury by a domesticated animal known to have a disposition to injure. Rylands appealed to the House of Lords which dismissed the appeal. Lord Cairns, speaking for the House of Lords, stated their agreement of Blackburn. J, but added a further limitation on liability, which is that the land from which escape occurs must have been modified in a way which would be considered non-natural, unusual or inappropriate. Note; The reason the case is called Rylands vs Fletcher when the plaintiff was Fletcher is that the rule was confirmed on appeal by Rylands at the House of Lords, hence the original case name reversed. The rule has its foundation in the Latin maxim ‘sic uture ut tuo alienum non laedes’ (means you can use your land the way you want but hurt no neighbor). The essence of the rule is the protection of neighbors’ property caused by importation of this abnormally dangerous, potentially dangerous, hyper hazardous, or things that carry with them extra ordinary degree of danger.. The rule imposes a certain standard of care- the more the thing is dangerous, the higher degree of care to be exercised. Essentially therefore, the rule is about the responsibility presumed when dealing with dangerous things. N.B, The rule is not distinct from trespass the kind of damage envisaged is not direct physical touch, entry or intrusion on the land. See A.G vs Ivan Eriya Kafeero Mambule [1959] E.A 665 LIMBS OF THE RULE For the case to fall under Rylands vs Fletcher, the following must be established; Bringing on the land; According to Blackburn J’s statement (supra), the defendant must have brought on the land for his own purposes something which he has accumulated and kept there. If water in Rylands v Fletcher case had been naturally on the land, there would have been no cause of action. In David Dibya vs Uganda Electricity Board [1980] HCB 119, where UEB left hanging live ‘highly dangerous cables’ on the road and the plaintiff was shocked upon stepping on them, it was held that the rule applied. Non- natural user; The House of Lords (Lord Cairn) in Rylands vs Fletcher stated that the rule applies where the defendant makes a non-natural use of his land. What does this mean? In Rickards vs Lothian [1913] AC 263 at 280, the Privy Council treated this in flexible terms when Lord Moulton, (speaking for Privy Council) stated; “It is not every use o which land is put that brings into play that principle. It must be some special use bringing with it increased danger to others, and must not merely be ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general benefit of the community” Read, Cambridge Water Co. vs. Eastern Counties Leather plc [1994] 2 A.C 264. In Read vs Lyons & co. [1947] AC 156, [1946] 2 ALLER 471, the appellants, while working in the respondent’s factory was injured by an explosion there. She did not plead negligence, but sought to show that the respondents as manufacturers of dangerous things (explosives) were strictly liable. The House of Lords held for the defendants because there had not been an escape from the defendant’s land. But on ‘non- natural use’ Lord Porter said; “I think that all the circumstances of the time and place of mankind must be taken into consideration so that what might be regarded as non natural may vary according to those circumstances” It is thus the creation of a recognizable risk to other landowners which is an essential constituent of the liability of the defendant. Once such risk has been created, the liability for foreseeable consequences of failure to control and confine is strict. Read; Mason vs Levy Auto Parts of England Ltd [1967]2 QB 530 AT 542-543 Marcic vs Thames Water utilities Ltd [2003] 3 WLR 1603 Things likely to do mischief The things brought on the land must be potentially or actually dangerous. He word ‘dangerous’ has somewhat road meaning in Rylands vs Fletcher . The thing must be capable of being dangerous upon entering the neighboring land. Hence water and filth are dangerous under the rule. The test is whether damage is likely if the ‘thing’ escapes. Therefore, the only objects to qualify are those that are both likely to escape and, in so doing entail exceptional peril to others. In order to attract the rule, there must be both an extraordinary user of the land and the object must in the circumstances be classified as dangerous. ‘Escape’ According to Viscount Simon in Read vs Lyons (supra), there must be “escape from a place where the defendant has occupation of or control over the land to a place which is outside his occupation or control’ Hence in that case, an explosion which injured the plaintiff on the defendant’s own land had not escaped and the rule did not apply. Viscount Simon stated that Rylands vs Fletcher is conditioned by two elements which he called, 1) “the condition of ‘escape’ from land of something likely to do mischief if it escapes” 2) “ the condition of ‘non-natural’ use of the land In Read vs Lyons, the House of Lords stressed that the rule was primarily concerned with rights and duties of occupiers of land. Thus escape from the defendant’s land or control is an essential element. Note: Like nuisance and negligence, Rylands v Fletcher is not actionable perse. Actual damage must be proved. Application in Uganda, Read, Consultant Gas Engineers vs Micheal Bitature & Anor C.A 36/1993 (unreported) Points to ponder about Ø Ryland’s vs Fletcher rule is a remedy to damage to land Ø It does not apply to activities, works or operations authorized by statute. Trasco vs Metropolitan Boruogh Council Ø The rule is not particularly strict because it excludes liability when the escape is for most common reasons vandalism or unusual natural events. Ø If the escape is not due to reasons of vandalism or unusual natural events it gives rise to an inference of negligence. Ø The ill defined exception of ‘natural’ use of land makes the application of the rule impracticable and since 2nd world war no one has succeeded in England in an action in under Rylands v Fletcher rule. Ø Strict liability on social grounds should better be left to statutory intervention. Read, Ø Blake vs Woolf [1898] 2 Q.B 426 Ø North Western Utilities Ltd vs London Guarantee & Accident Co. Ltd. [1936] A.C 108 Defences In the course of interpreting the rule in Rylands v Fletcher, several specific exceptions or defences have been developed. Statutory authority; Normally public bodies are exempted from liability unless it is shown that the acted negligently. Statutory authority like railways and public utilities supplying water (NWSC), gas and electricity (UEDCL), KCC, Uganda Wildlife Authority, etc. It was stated in Trasco vs Stockport Metropolitan borough Council [2004] 1 ALLER 589 that a statute which authorizes the construction of woks like reservoirs, involving high risk to others, may deal expressly with the liability of the undertakers. That in the absence of negligence, damge caused by operations authorized by statute is not compensatable unless the statute expressly so provides. The House of Lords affirmed the decision in Geddis vs Proprietors of Bann Reserviors (1878) 3 App Cass 430,455 where Lord Blackburn summed up the defence that, “ it is now thoroughly well established that no action will lie for doing that which the legislature has authorized, if it be done without negligence, although it does occasion damage to anyone” Statutory immunity is lost if the grantee fails in his duty of care to avoid all unnecessary harm. Read, Ø Charring Cross electricity co. vs Hydraulic Power co [1914]3 K.B 772 Ø Longhurst vs Mentropolitan Water board [1948] 2 ALLER 834 Ø Dunne vs North Western Gas Board [1964]2 QB 806 Act of a stranger or third party. Liability is excluded under Rylands vs Fletcher rule if the escape was due to the deliberate act of a stranger which could not be reasonably anticipated. The stranger’s interference must have been “a conscious act of volition”, deliberate or intentional, and not merely negligent, because it appears that the owner of a dangerous thing is bound to guard others against negligence of third parties. see, Dominion Gas Co. vs Collins [1909] A.C 640, at 647 Read, Rickards vs Lothian [1913] A.C 263 Volenti non-fit injuria: This applies if the plaintiff has knowingly and voluntarily consented to the bringing of the thing on the defendant’s land. Read, Peters vs Prince of Wales Theatre [1943] K.B. 73 Contributory negligence See, Dunn vs Birmingham Canal co. Ltd [1872] LR 7 Q.B 224, the plaintiff worked a mine under the defendant’s canal. This caused the water of the canal to seep through the mine to the plaintiff’s land. Corkburn, CJ said, “The plaintiff saw the danger and may be said to have courted it” Act of God; Fleming (6th Edition, p.316) defines an Act of god to signify the operations of natural forces, free from human intervention, rather than phenomena which, in common belief, are sometimes attributed to a positive intervention of deity If the escape arises from natural causes and without human intervention in circumstances which no human foresight could have provided for, that is said to be an act of god. In Nicholas vs Marsland [1876] 2 EX.D 1, the defence was allowed where an extremely violent thunderstorm caused flooding. Earthquakes and tornadoes may fall here. But ordinary rain, a small storm etc may not. Whether a particular occurrence amounts to an act of god is a question of fact. The test is not whether or not the event could be reasonably foreseeable, but whether or not human foresight and prudence could reasonably recognize the possibility of such an event. (See; Fleming p.317, Lamb vs Phillips(1911) 11SR (N.S.W)109). It therefore seems to differ from “inevitable” accident both in degree of unexpectability and exclusion of events having a casual link with human activity. Escapes of water and the like are often the result of natural events-heavy rains or drains blocked by falling leaves. In Carstairs vs Taylor (1871) LR 6 Ex 217 Kelly CB said that a rat gnawing a hole in a wooden gutter box counted as an Act of god Personal injury- in Cambridge Water Co. vs Eastern Counties Leather p/c [1994] AC 264 court stated that damages for personal injuries are not recoverable under the rule. This was affirmed by Lord Hoffman in Trasco vs Stockport Metropolitan borough Council [2004] 1 ALLER 589; [2004] AC 1 Read, Greenock Corporation vs Caledonian Ry [1917] A.C 556 Common benefit Default of the plaintiff Remoteness of damage Questions; 1) Discuss the principles in Ryands vs Fletcher and explain the problems that have been encountered in its application. 2) “There will never be a case where the plaintiff will succeed in Rylands vs Fletcher without also succeeding in Negligence, and there would rarely be a plaintiff who will succeed in nuisance without also succeeding in Negligence” Critically examine this statement, clearly highlighting the nexus among the three causes of action. 3) “The rule in Rylands vs Fletcher is an extension of both nuisance and negligence” Per Ssekandi J in Paskali Bahizi vs Kibandama, Civil Appeal No. 93 of 1976. [1977]HCB 91 Critically examine the above assertion in light of relevant authorities. LIABILITY FOR ANIMALS Notwithstanding the usefulness of animals, their propensity for harm may well justify imposing on the owner a duty to protect the community, at his peril, against the typical risks involved in keeping them for his own benefit. Ordinarily, the owner of animals is liable under the general law of tort in negligence for the damage they inflict. There are however, cases where liability for animals is strict ie where negligence need not be proved. These are; a) Liability for cattle trespass b) Liability under Scienter rule. Both the cattle- trespass rule and liability for dangerous animals are but instances of the wider principle of strict liability which, attaches to the control of all exceptionally dangerous things. See, Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort, 11th Ed. Pg 433-443; 15th Ed. Pg569-582 John G. Fleming, The law of Torts, 6th Ed. Ps 324-337 Cattle Trespass. This is not an ordinary trespass, since trespass is ‘direct intentional interference’ It is not nuisance since; a) substantial interference need not be proved b) the defendant’s conduct need not be unreasonable This head of claim is normally relied on where the invasion by cattle is not intentional on the cattle-owner’s part. Where it is intentional or as a result of negligence, it is more sensible to proceed in trespass and negligence respectively. Cattle trespass is also different from Rylands vs Fletcher because; a) It is irrelevant whether land from which animals escape is being put to natural use b) It is actionable per se ( no need to prove damage) c) It only arises when the land owner also has interest in the cattle d) It is possible to have cattle trespass without cattle Ingredients of cattle trespass. The keeper of cattle is bound at his peril to keep them from trespassing and to prevent harm from animals of whose dangerous tendencies he has actual or presumed knowledge. a) There must be cattle: The definition of cattle extends to cows, bulls, goats,swine, sheep, horses, asses, domestic birds (hens, geese, ducks, turkeys peacocks). But it does not include cats and dogs. Read; Tallents vs Bell [1944] 2 ALLER 474; Buckle vs Holmes [1926]2 K.B 125 Theya vs Purnell [1918] 2 K.B 333 Searle vs Wallbank [1947] A.C 341 b) The defendant need not have intended the trespass and need not have acted negligently. c) There need not be damage suffered. Liability for straying animals. Brock vs Richards-as a general proposition, the owner of animals is under no liability to prevent them from straying, even though the straying may take a form of leaping over or through hedges. No liability attaches to the owner of such animals simply because he has allowed them to escape from his land. There is no obligation in such circumstances to fence one's land and to keep one's domestic animals in. The rule although found in earlier common law is usually referred to as the rule in Searle v. Wallbank[1947] A.C 341 In Searle v. Wallbank[1947] A.C 341 the plaintiff was injured when at 1.30 a.m. on 1 April 1944 the bicycle which he was riding collided with the defendant's horse on a public highway. The plaintiff's front light was masked in accordance with war-time regulations at the time of the accident. The field, in which the horse was kept, with other animals, adjoined the highway and the horse escaped because of a defective fence. The House of Lords in dismissing the plaintiff's appeal held that the owner of a field adjoining the highway is under no prima facie legal obligation to users of the highway so to keep and maintain his hedges and gates along the highway as to prevent his animals from straying onto it. Nor is he under any duty to users of the highway to take reasonable care to prevent any of his animals, not known to be dangerous, from straying onto the highway. The justification for the rule in Searle v. Wallbank seems to be mainly historical. It has been stated that “in early times, very few roads were fenced off from the adjoining land, and it would have been a considerable imposition on the owner of cattle if he had been compelled to prevent them from straying”. Moreover, road users were usually taken to have accepted the risks inherent in road travel and this seems to have included the possibility of the presence of straying animals. In recent years, however, because of the increasing speed with which road traffic moves, because of the increasing number of wide and fast-surfaced roads, and because of the serious consequences which may occur nowadays if fast moving traffic collides with animals on the highway, a great deal of dissatisfaction has been expressed about the rule in Searle v. Wallbank. Judicial precedents have put limits on the scope of the rule viz; First, it seems that it does not apply in Ireland, if the animals are straying on the roadway in sufficiently large numbers to cause an obstruction. Second, it was held in Brock vs Richards [1951] 1 K.B 529 at p.535 that the rule does not apply to wild animals or to domestic animals who show peculiar characteristics or where scienter is proved. Thus, if a person knows that his dog has a mischievous propensity to chase passing motor-cyclists he may be liable in scienter if he allows his dog to stray onto the highway. Third, it was held in Gomberg vs Smith [1963]1Q.B 25 it does not apply if animals are brought onto the highway. Fourth, in Howard v. Bergin, O'Connor & Co. O'Connor J., was inclined to limit the application of Searle v. Wallbank to rural conditions. He was of the opinion that the defence that there was no obligation on adjoining owners to fence and that there was no liability for any damage caused by straying animals in any circumstances, was too wide a proposition to be accepted as law. Although it was unnecessary for him to decide the question in the case before him, and although he could find no authorities to support him, he was inclined to the view that the common law which relieves occupiers of land adjoining the highway from fencing does not apply to cities. City dwellers, should according to O'Connor's view, be obliged to fence. Lastly in the case of Ellis v. Johnstone [1963] 2 Q.B. 8 it was stated that where there were special circumstances such as peculiar topography or where the animal was engaged in an activity which could only be carried on under a high degree of human control it has been suggested that liability might also arise. See also Bativala v. West [1970] 1 Q.B. 716 Liability for dangerous animals Liability under the Scienter rule When an animal of harmless species betrays its own kind by perpetrating damage, its keeper will not be held to strict liability unless actually of its dangerous disposition. This proof is known technically as ‘the scienter rule’. This head is concerned with liability for damage done by animals which are in the control of the defendant when he knows or is presumed to know of their tendency to do harm of the type In the case of Behrens & Anor vs Bertram Mills circus Ltds [1957]2 QB 1 Lord Devlin. J stated that the law as follows; a person who keeps an animal with knowledge (scienter retinuit) of its tendency to do harm is strictly liable for damage that it does if it escapes; he is under absolute duty to confine or control it so that it shall not do injury to others. Unlike Rylands vs Fletcher, no escape need have occurred. Secondly, it basically deals with personal injuries.. Thirdly unlike rylands vs fletcher rule that is based on the occupation of the land, scienter rule is based on the possession of the animal, see Bertram’s case. For purposes of this tort, animals are divided into; a) Ferae naturae; Animals which are dangerous by nature b) Mansuetae naturae; ordinarily harmless animals “Harmless” animals are of two kinds; Those harmless by their very character e.g rabbits, and those shown by long experience to be harmless e.g sheep, horses and dogs. All animals in the second class (mansuetea naturae) are conclusively presumed to be harmless until they have manifested a savage or vicious propensity; proof of such manifestation is proof of scienter and serve s to transfer the animal, so to speak, out of its natural class into the class ferae naturea( Behrens & Anor vs Bertram Mills circus Ltds [1957]2 QB 1) On the other hand, all animals, ferae naturae ie all animals which are not by nature harmless or have not been tamed by man and domesticated are conclusively presumed to have such tendency to do harm so that the scienter need not in their case be proved. Lord Macmillan in regard to liability for such animals stated in Read vs Lyons & Co. Ltd [1946] 2 ALLER 471 at p.476 that a person is under absolute duty to confine or control ( a dangerous animal) so that it shall not do injury. There must be failure to control. Whether or not an animal is harmless under the scienter rule is a question of law. From decided cases, elephants, zebras, bears, bees, and lions are ferae naturae. In the case of Filburn vs Peoples Palace & Aquarium Co. Ltd (1890) 25 QBD 258 the court of Appeal held as a matter of law that an elephant is an animal ferae naturea. This decision was followed and considered to be binding by Lord Devlin j in Behrens & Anor vs Bertram Mills circus Ltds [1957]2 QB 1. Lord Devlin J further stated that the reason why this is a question of law and not a question of fact is because it is a matter of which judicial notice has to be taken and no evidence is required to prove it. This doctrine has from its formulation, proceeded on the supposition that knowledge of what kind of animals are tame and what kind are savage is common knowledge. However, common knowledge about the ordinary course of nature will extend to knowledge of the propensities of animals according to their different genera, but cannot be supposed to extend to the manner of behavior of animals of the same genus in the different parts of the world. The classification being a question of law the precedent suffices to justify the classification for the future. The balance of English authority before 1971 seemed to favour the view that whether an animal was to be classed as a ferae naturea or not depended on whether the animal belonged to a species which was a danger to mankind. See Buckle v Holmes [1926]2 K.B 125, although in determining the issue the courts may have regard to the experience of other countries with the animal. It seems that this was the reason why the English Court in McQuaker v. Goddard [1940] 1 K.B 687 classified a camel as mansuetae naturae. It seems that once a species has been judicially classified as dangerous, then, subject to the doctrine of precedent, there is no room for distinctions based upon the fact that some variants or individual animals within the species may not in fact be at all dangerous. Read; 1. M’Quaker vs goddard [1940] 1 K.B 687 at 700-1 2. Yesero Mugenyi vs Securicor (U) Ltd [1972] 1 ULR 80 3. Securicor (U) Ltd vs Yesero Mugenyi [1973]1 ULR 61(EACA) 4. Fulburn vs Peoples Palace Co. [1890]25 QBD 258 5. Glanville v. Sutton [1928] 1 K.B. 571. Mischievous propensity or viciousness When an animal ferae naturae causes injury, liability on the part of the keeper thereof automatically arises. But when the animal is ‘harmles’ (mansuetae naturae), then the plaintiff must prove scienter i.e. the dangerous propensity of the animal by showing; a) That the animal had previously committed or attempted to commit an act showing that particular trait of viciousness complained of b) That the defendant knew of the act or attempt Knowledge of one particular act of biting is sufficient. It is not necessary that the dog has been going around snapping at everybody. It is irrelevant that it is long since the animal last committed the kind of act. The kind of harm inflicted on the defendant must be direct and physical. Knowledge of particular propensity may be imputed to the defendant General knowledge of the tendencies of a harmless species – e.g. bulls will attack red, or greyhounds will chase running children – will not be sufficient evidence of mischievous propensity. The evidence must be specific; it must relate to the particular animal in question as well as the particular kind of damage complained of. The mischievous propensity need not be a chronic or permanent element of its nature, but may be a passing or temporary phase of the character or temper of the particular animal in question. Accordingly, a bitch with pups may have a mischievous propensity to bite, and a cow with calf afoot may have a mischievous propensity to attack. In Howard v. Bergin, O'Connor & Co. Kennedy C.J. put the matter in the following way: “In my opinion, however, what is called a “mischievous propensity” may be as well a passing or temporary phase of character or temper of the particular animal as a chronic or permanent element of its nature. If this opinion needs any authority to support it, reference may be made to, inter alia, Turner v. Coates; Manton v. Brocklebank. .... I understand by the expression “a mischievous propensity”, a propensity to do mischief, a tendency to do harm or cause injury, whether, in one case, by some single characteristic action such as kicking or goring or biting or, in another case, generally when mischief may be done in any of a variety of ways.” The defendant must have the knowledge of the vicious propensity before he will be liable in scienter. To summarize the law, a) Knowledge means actual knowledge, but it is immaterial whether it be acquired, b) From personal observation or by hearsay, whether c) By the defendant himself or by his servant who has general charge of the animal, and d) A long time before or only shortly before injury complained of e) Both the vicious act and the defendant’s knowledge of it may be proved by an admission of a very general nature. In Bennet & Another vs Walsh knowledge of a mischievous propensity by a nine year old girl was sufficient to render her father liable in scienter. In Brock vs Richards 1951] 1 K.B 529 the Court of Appeal of England (Sir Raymond Evershed MR) stated that in order to impose liability, the characteristics mus be those of viciousness or mischievousness. That the word “vicious” as applied to animals is well understood and indicates a savage disposition, a propensity to attack people. The Master of Rolls (MR) further stated that an animal though not savage, which is dangerous because of its frolicsome behavior, must equally be taken to have propensities against which (if known to the owner) the owner has a duty to guard. The Proper Defendant: Owner or Keeper? Liability in scienter is by possession rather than by ownership. The problem becomes acute only where possession and ownership are separated as where, for example, a person lends an animal to another or gives it to another under a contract of bailment. The word used in the old writ – scienter retinuit – also supports the view that possession should be the crucial factor in determining liability rather than ownership. In Walker v. Hall (1876) 40 J.P 456 the trainer of a horse which he knew was accustomed to bite was held liable simply because he had control over the animal. Although it is doubtful whether the owner is liable as such a master who obliges a servant to keep an animal in the course of his employment, may be vicariously liable in scienter, or at any rate in negligence Read, Knott v. London County Council [1934] 1 K.B. 126; North v. Wood [1914] 1 K.B. 629. In Crean v. Nolan & Others sheep belonging to the plaintiff were killed by some beagles, which had strayed after the termination of a drag hunt organised by the Festival of Kerry Committee. It was held that although a prima facie principal-agent relationship existed between the Festival Committee and the owners of the beagles, this relationship had ended at the time when the beagles had killed the sheep some considerable time after the hunt was over. It is clearly suggested in this case that the defendants might have been liable either in trespass, in negligence or if scienter was proved, if the damage was inflicted during the hunt. During the hunt the Festival Committee it seems would have had sufficient control to attract liability. What is the distinction between ferae naturae and mansuetera naturea animals? What exactly amounts to a “mischievous propensity” on the part of a mansueturea animal? Who is the proper defendant in the sceinter action; the owner of the animal or its keeper? What defences are available to the defendant in such an action? Liability for fire The early common law provided a special action of trespass on the case against occupiers for “negligently using fire and allowing its escape contrary to the general custom of the realm”. However the later judicial developments remodeled the law. It fire was readily treated as a Ryland vs Fletcher object in E,. Asia Nav. Co vs Fremantle Harbour (1951) 83 C.L.R 353. The new principle of strict liability came to be applied not only to escaping fire that has been brought on the land (like igniting rubbish) but also to all other things likely to catch fire and kept under conditions involving substantial risk of spreading to neighbours. The case of Collingwood vs Home & Colonial Stores Ltd (1936) CA, highlights the position before the Fire Prevetion (Metropolis) Act 1774 and after. Lord Wright MR stated that, the state of law before the statute was that a man was liable at common law for damage done by fire originating on his property; (i) by the mere escape of fire - that was the old rule; (ii) if the damage was caused by the negligence of himself or his servants,or by his own willful act; and (iii) On the principle of Rylands vs Fetcher However, sec. 86 of the Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774 altered the earlier position. That section provides in effect that no action shall be brought against any person in whose house chamber, or other building any fire shall accidentally begin, any law usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. That Act changed the law, because before the Act if fire spread from a man’s premises and did damage to adjoining premises, he was liable in damage on the broad ground that it was his duty at his own peril to keep any fire that originated on his premises from spreading to and damaging his neighbor’s premises. The protection of the section is limited by the word “accidentally”. Read Goldman vs Hargraves & Ors [1966]2 ALLER 989, [1967]1 AC 645. The Act did not apply to a fire caused deliberately or negligently. The common law position was reiterated in the Ugandan case of Uganda Motors Limited vs Wavvah Holdings SCCA No. 19/1991 where the Supreme Court further sated that the Fire Prevention ( Metropolis) Act 1774 though an Act of general Application was no longer applicable in Uganda because reference to Acts of general applicability was deleted from the 1967 Judicature Act. It followed therefore that if fire originated from the appellant’s premises, then having in mind that the premises comprised a motor garage and repair shop that it pointed to negligence on the part of the appellant. Much as earlier authorities in Uganda reflected that the defendant could claim protection under Fire Prevention (Metropolis) Act 1774, where there was no negligence, the Supreme Court imputed negligence where no explanation could be given on what caused fire. It further expressly stated that the Act was no longer applicable in Uganda. This position is different from the Tanzanian position as reflected in Rahmtulla Bandali vs The Commmisioner of Transport, The East African Railways & Harbours, Tanzania Civil Case No. 1576 of 1967 where Court stated that in order to hold the occupier of the premises liable in damages for fire breaking out on such premises, negligence on his part must be positively established. Read, Balfour vs Barty King [1957] 1 QB 496

Monday, September 7, 2009

Collaborative Law and Lawyers in Peace Making: A Paradigm Shift in Dispute Settlement.

By Arinaitwe Patson Wilbroad[1]
Introduction; “The Courts of this country should not be places where the resolution of disputes begin, they should be places where disputes end-after alternative methods of resolving disputes have been considered and tried” Sandra Day O’Connor[2] Abstract The increased cost of litigation has not decreased the number of lawsuits filed each year. Even the economic recession has not helped. The majority of Ugandans probably have been or will be involved in a law suit at some point in their lives. They will be a party to a breach of contract, mortgage sale, will contest, land dispute, family dispute, or other legal action that requires legal representation. When disputes arise, most people do not realize that they have a choice in the manner in which their dispute is settled, and that there are several alternative dispute resolution procedures that are more efficient and economical than litigation[3]. Collaborative law/practice is novel on the dispute resolution scene in Uganda, and many people are unfamiliar with the mechanics of the process. It is as different from litigation as day is to night. It is also different from other dispute resolution mechanisms like mediation and arbitration. This article will detail effects of litigation, the historical development of collaborative practice, how it operates, whether it is any different from other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms especially mediation and its distinguishing features, and the criticism levied on the practice. It will address the benefits of the collaborative law process for parties and lawyers and further look at challenges in applying it in Uganda’s context and the need for retooling the mind towards alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. It concludes with how collaborative law aims to become a main method for peacefully resolving legal disputes.
Do parties really need to go to court? The psychological and emotional effects of litigation has resulted in the establishment of special courts like Industrial Courts to handle commercial, labor and tax disputes. There are also Family and Children Courts, Commercial Courts and Land Tribunals. These courts seek ways to end conflict, promote justice and cooperation between the parties. Nonetheless, the problem remains with the parties increasingly relying on others to craft solutions for problems “created” by one or more of the parties. Neither the litigants nor their lawyers are committed to seeking the best alternative for both parties. The result: litigants give control of their lives and businesses to others and are seldom, if ever, satisfied with the outcome[4]. This adversarial process inherently focuses on “blame” in order to “win.” The end results find litigants giving control of their disputes to third parties and then being seldom, if ever, satisfied with the outcomes. Most lawyers will tell you that they settle most of their cases. They will also tell you that settlement generally occurs on or near the day scheduled for trial after months filled with written discovery, gathering and examining documents (most of which are irrelevant), depositions, expert reports (if it is a complex matter requiring an expert), applications to compel, enjoin third parties, security for costs, applications to enforce, mediation, and the exhaustion of the clients’ patience and monetary resources. If a case does go to trial and the client “wins,” there is often an appeal, then a stay of execution, sometimes an application for security of costs and everyone gets to start all over. So what does it mean to win in litigation? Is winning getting money even if it destroys any chance of an important ongoing business or family relationship? Is winning punishing the other side even if the final order does not correct the reason there was a loss or injury in the first place? Or is winning getting a piece of paper called a judgment when the defendant’s assets are “judgment” proof? What if winning could be equated to satisfying the interests of all of the parties as much as possible? When dispute resolution focuses on the clients' interests instead of "winning," there is a much greater opportunity for the parties to experience lasting satisfaction with the outcome. Until the interests of the parties are addressed, no one really wins, and there is frequently no lasting resolution[5]. Procedurally, the practice of litigation has become more complicated and more tactical. It is not uncommon for lawyers to use both delay, prolonged, and expensive litigation as strategies to help achieve a particular result for a client. To echo the words of Federal judge Justice Rosalie Abella, “we have moved from a society governed by the rule of law to being a society governed by the law of rules”[6]. The vocabulary of battle is sprinkled throughout our professional exchanges and correspondences between lawyers, “stand duly warned”, “we have no option but to unleash the legal machinery”, “we shall coerce you by due process of the law”. A system that treats litigants as adversarial is destructive to future relationship, be it business or family. The legal process frames all problems as disputes and this encourages parties to battle instead of working together to resolve shared problems. Those wanting to work together fear that the system itself will make things worse, not better. Being a competitive exercise, litigation proceeds by selective disclosure and tactical maneuver, mobilizing evidence and witnesses favorable to one side and suppressing or discrediting the ones favorable to the other. Particularly where clients are disturbed and vulnerable as in a divorce, the warrior's first instincts are to "throw up a perimeter" and fire off heavy rhetoric or onerous discovery to let the other side know they are in for a fight[7]. We hear the client groan, but persuade him that it's for his own "protection," The tone thus having been set, the other side responds in kind. Differences between the parties are emphasized so as to eclipse areas of agreement. To the first offer of settlement the stout-hearted lawyer may say, perhaps over-protectively, "I wouldn't let my client agree to that."
The court system remains over-burdened, working hard to maintain “access to justice” while trying to modify procedures and rules to promote settlement. Most judicial officers especially in the High Court speak and encourage mediation. This has been followed by a pilot study on practice of mediation supervised by court. This has not yielded much but we cannot underestimate the results achieved so far. Sometimes it is the lawyers that frustrate the process waiting for the matter to be referred back to the judge. One advocate wanted to secure a date for a scheduling conference before the mediation started, reasoning that “in case mediation failed…” Such opinion, of course, shows little commitment to the process from the very beginning. Some lawyers who have called ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) as “Accelerated Degeneration of Revenue”[8] The lawyer's instinct to prove her/his zeal by adopting the client's positions and attitudes often leads to unrealistic expectations. Reality may not set in until trial looms or the liquid assets that might have provided a readjustment cushion have been consumed in the struggle. A hasty settlement in the corridors of the court house undermines any sense of control in the client, and increases the risk of drafting errors and hindsight. When the terms are less favorable than the client was prepared to expect, he may be subject to either party’s remorse. And the high emotions and unpredictable results of a trial carry their own risks of dissatisfaction. But don't clients hire fighters not settlers? A lawyer who like most, bills himself as a fighter is likely to attract clients who want to fight. When one's only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. However, there will always be one who casts oneself as a settler of disputes and will attract a remarkable number of clients who fear getting enmeshed in litigation with its publicity and other attending effects. Removing the element of adversary naturally disconcerts lawyers who have not learned other ways to resolve a clash of interests[9]. Being accomplished in the use of the Civil Practice Rules to ferret out discoverable information or to preclude untimely claims and issues, one may feel unprotected or even helpless without those weapons in hand. But are they necessary to provide a client the essential benefits of legal representation?
What is Collaborative Law? Collaborative Practice/collaborative law is the brain child of a Minneapolis lawyer, Stu Webb[10]. In 1990 Webb was a jaded family law practitioner who “just could not take it anymore”[11]. He disliked the adversarial nature of his practice. He was finding it harder to tolerate the schizophrenic nature of trial work and the incivility that seemed to be increasing[12]. Webb had no desire to continue with family law litigation and was ready to quit practice. Instead of retiring he turned his mind to restructuring his practice. He concentrated on settling his family files and took of a favorite, settlement-oriented, colleague on the other side. As professional companions, they enjoyed working together and were usually successful in resolving their cases. There came a case they could not settle. As both had been trained to do, they went to court, on their clients instructions. The end result was disastrous for Webb’s working relationship with his colleague[13]. Pondering what happened, Webb came close to locking his office door and walking away. However, he decided he had nothing to lose by continuing to practice and telling his clients that his role would be limited to settlement and if the case could not be settled, they would have to hire a new lawyer to take their case to court. On 1st January 1990, he began his Collaborative practice to save his clients from soul destroying litigation and to make his practice fun again. As Collaborative Practice began to develop, it became clear that collaborative practitioners should work together to promote and improve the process, which was still in infancy. In mid 1990s, California collaborative groups began to meet monthly. Out of their vision to form an umbrella networking organization to serve collaborative practice in many forms, the American Institute of Collaborative Professionals (AICP) was born. By 2000, Collaborative Practice was developing exponentially across Canada, and to reflect its international reach, the name of the organization was changed to the International Academy of Collaborative Professionals. The IACP now boasts of membership across the globe, especially USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Uganda. Uganda now has around eight lawyers who have been trained in Collaborative Practice under the auspices of Collaborative Professionals from USA[14].The extensive history of IACP is chronicled on the IACP website; www.collaborativepractice.com. The practice started predominately in family matters, especially divorce. However, it has since evolved to encompass civil and commercial disputes, among others. Collaborative practice is about cooperation, not confrontation. It has been described as “Law without litigation”, “Mediation with advice”. It is a way of solving problems with lawyers assisting the parties to understand each other’s perspective. The clients are responsible for information gathering and for generating options to provide solutions. The most fundamental characteristic of the process is that it creates a safe environment in which each party can work successfully toward achieving his or her goals. Each party and their collaborative professionals acknowledge that the essence of Collaborative Law is the shared belief that it is in the best interest of the parties and their families to avoid adversarial proceedings, to commit themselves to resolving their differences in a manner that is empowering with minimal conflict, and to working together to create shared solutions to the issues. This process relies on an atmosphere of mutual respect, honesty, cooperation, and a commitment to maintaining a safe environment, with the objective of ensuring the continued good business relationship for commercial entities and future well-being of the parties and their children in the case of family disputes. The lawyers and other professionals are trained to guide and assist the clients to engage in interest-based negotiation to generate options that are future focused and to prevent the process from becoming weighed down by issues of blame and the purely legal “rights” of each party. The Collaborative Process is based on team work, full disclosure, honesty, respect, civility, healing, integrity, parity of costs, exploration of alternatives to determine a fair resolution, and parties maintaining control over the results. If this sounds like fantasy, hold on because this is only the beginning. The goal of Collaborative Law is to maximize the settlement options of all parties, to increase the abilities of the parties to communicate, and to minimize the potential negative economic, social and emotional consequences which are the by-products of the traditional adversarial court process. The important difference between Collaborative Practice and conventional litigation is the commitment to reach an agreement without going to court. The parties maintain control of the process and the decisions instead of relinquishing them to a judge. To reach this goal, the parties with the help of their lawyers agree not to seek court intervention by committing to stay in the negotiation process and focus on settlement by design from the outset. The High Court came up with the mediation process before trial. However, much as some cases have been resolved, a cross-section of lawyers attend mediation as a procedural requirement, waiting to agree to disagree so that the matter can be referred back to the judge. This has not helped in as far as parties being committed to the mediation process are concerned. It is still seen as a court manned process not any different from scheduling or other court processes. The process in outline is as follows; (a) each client is represented by their respective lawyer/advocate throughout the process. (b) The lawyers stand in the role of “ally” to their client and seek to advance their interest.[15] (c) Both lawyers help the client and the other party work as a team to: find and focus on clients’ common interests; understand each other’s concerns; exchange information; explore a wide range of possible choices; and reach solutions acceptable to both of them. The Collaborative Process[16] The Collaborative Process is voluntary and cannot be court ordered, so all parties and lawyers must agree to participate. Once the process has been agreed upon, the parties to the dispute and their collaboratively trained lawyers sign a participation agreement that sets out the guidelines to be followed during the process. Since collaborative lawyers will never represent the collaborative parties in court, they are able to focus all of their skills on the interests of the parties and resolution of the dispute rather than dividing time and energy between trying to settle and preparing for trial. This concerted effort allows disputes to be settled months, sometimes years, earlier than settlements that occur on the courthouse steps or corridors. The collaborative approach redefines good law practice as analysis, clarification, and negotiation. It is the ability to utilize skills seldom seen in litigation. Collaborative lawyers do not rely on taking advantage of the other sides' mistakes and oversights, nor do they seek to avoid revealing the entire truth of the matter in dispute. Power plays or similar tactics are all unacceptable in the collaborative approach. The actual resolution of the dispute takes place in a series of two to three hour long, face-to-face meetings of the parties and their lawyers. Each meeting follows an agenda that the participants receive in advance of the meetings, and no decisions are made regarding the actual dispute outside the presence of the parties. Step One The first step determines the interests and goals of all of the parties. The parties have an opportunity to state what they want and, perhaps more importantly, why they want it. Each party also has the opportunity to hear the goals and interests of the other parties from the mouths of the parties instead of having messages channeled through lawyers. This saves time and eliminates misunderstandings, confusion, and any “spin” that frequently accompanies hearsay. Since the parties are required to state the underlying basis of their concerns, they must consider their interests and goals more carefully rather than simply make demands that have no basis in anything remotely related to reality as opposed to positional bargaining which is the primary tool used for negotiations in the litigation process. The goals of positional bargaining are for the plaintiffs to get as much as possible, whether the amount is deserved or not, and for the defendants to pay nothing, or as little as possible, whether they are liable or not. In the collaborative process the participants examine the facts of the dispute and use interest based negotiation to work toward an agreement that is equitable for all of the parties.
Step Two Determining interests and goals also lets the parties have a much better idea of the documents and other information that must be collected to intelligently approach resolution of the dispute. The second step of the collaborative process is the task of actually gathering the necessary information. Parties and their lawyers agree to request the production of only those documents relevant to the dispute. Participants also agree to voluntarily comply with requests for delivery of information. Some disputes will require an expert opinion. In those instances, the parties may agree to jointly employ a single expert. The use of a single, objective, expert opinion will provide the parties with accurate, unbiased information and reduce the cost of the expert’s fee. Step Three The focus of the face-to-face meetings is now ready to advance to the third step which is the development of as many options as is reasonably possible. Brainstorming options will lead to out-of-the-box thinking that will result in opportunities for formulating creative solutions. The entire collaborative process is confidential, so parties are free to engage in speculation and conjecture without fear that their words will later be used against them. As the parties explore possibilities, they should be encouraged to concentrate discussions on the future. When negligence is an issue, responsibility for damages must be discussed; however, the lawyers should direct the discussions to the actions of the responsible party and avoid judgmental personal attacks. Casting blame or finger pointing is, at its very best, nonproductive. Apology sometimes becomes a part of the collaborative process, but an apology should never be offered unless it is a sincere expression of regret. Every option the participants suggest should be listed on a white board, overhead, or some type of media that is able to be viewed by all of the participants in the face-to-face meetings. Some options may seem unrealistic or one-sided to one party but not to another; nevertheless, all options should be listed and none evaluated until the next step of the process. What may seem unrealistic at first glance may later be part of the solution.
Step Four Once the parties are satisfied that they have developed a comprehensive list of options, they will evaluate the options and discard any that are inappropriate. The parties may find that an option must be modified or combined with other options in order to achieve their goals. During this fourth step, it is hoped that each party will become comfortable with opposing lawyer; however, it is very important that clients understand that although this is a collaborative approach, the parties must not rely on anyone but their own lawyer for legal advice. Step Five The final step of the Collaborative Process is the negotiation of a resolution which takes each party’s interests into consideration. This is made possible by following the steps in the process and systematically working through the elements of the dispute. Options are discovered and solutions are explored that would never have been mentioned or considered in the litigation process. Parties should not expect the Collaborative Process to be a series of calm, subdued tea parties. The face-to-face meetings may involve lively discussions and arguments; however, the arguments will be based on the issues in dispute and will not consist of personal attacks and unreasonable demands. Collaborative lawyers I interacted with intimated that they have found that the Collaborative Process involves harder work than litigation since the lawyers are not free to stomp out of the room shouting, “I’ll see you at court.” When the going gets tough the collaborative lawyers must stay the course and work even harder to assist the parties in finding more and better options for resolution. All the four-way meetings in the Collaborative Process always follow the same steps: Identify what is important to each client (interests); Identify what questions the clients need to answer; gather information; create the maximum number of choices; evaluate the options and modify and refine them; negotiate an acceptable agreement; and, closure. The Collaborative Process will not be suitable to every client or for every dispute. It is simply another tool available in ADR. One significant advantage is that it allows the parties to generate options for the solution of issues between them that would not be available through the court process. Further, the clients choose the outcome in a process where they have control. No Court or other Adversarial Intervention By choosing to employ a Collaborative Law process, parties commit to settle their matter without adversarial involvement. They agree to give full, honest and open disclosure of all information, whether requested or not, and to engage in informal discussions and conferences to settle the dispute. Parties agree to cooperate in obtain information from accountants, employers, pension and profit sharing plans, as well as any other documents relevant to the process. Parties agree that a Court Order may be necessary to acquire information which cannot be obtained by releases. This process anticipates the preparation and filing of the necessary court pleadings to effect the provisions of the agreements and complete the process. Participation with Integrity Participants and professionals agree to work to protect the privacy and dignity of all involved in this process. Each participant will maintain a high standard of integrity and demonstrate respect for the needs and concerns of the other. Specifically, participants shall not take advantage of the other participants, nor of the miscalculations, misperceptions, or mistakes of others, but shall identify them for correction.
Roles of Collaborative Professionals. The first strategic objective of professionals working in a client-centered process is to raise clients’ awareness of the direct connection that exists between success in achieving their macro goals and their behavior throughout the process. In contrast to the adversarial approach, advocacy in a client-centered model becomes advocacy for the process rather than advocacy for a position. “Feeling safe” is no longer some abstract concept; it becomes the clients’ experience of an environment and a process that is transparent in all its aspects: communication, information development, transitional decision-making, option development, consequence evaluation, bilateral negotiation, and resolution. In a client-centered process, the identification of these types of shared, macro goals becomes a critical primary task. A macro goal is an outcome objective that is held by the parties and is so big as to seem simplistic and obvious. At the outset of the process when the clients are typically anxious and skeptical, the simple act of having each of them acknowledge these core goals establishes a positive tone and powerful criteria for all that follows. These macro-goals establish benchmarks against which all subsequent actions may be measured. Either the clients engage in the process in a manner that moves them closer to the attainment of those core goals, or their actions take them further away. If the process structure and applications have been strategically designed to give clients every opportunity to achieve those goals, then one of the most important aspects of a client-centered process has been achieved: highlighting the responsibility that the clients bear for the success of the outcome. They can choose to act strategically with the support of the process and the professionals, or they can allow their emotions to drive their conduct, with the predictable chaos that results. Client-centered means that the process is of the clients-- its primary objective is to identify the shared goals of the parties, i.e. their macro goals; about the client—it helps the parties articulate and define their concerns and interests in a manner that enhances the likelihood of their achieving their macro goals; for the clients—it requires that the clients be educated regarding the cause-and-effect relationship between their goals and their behaviors while the process is in progress. The process adapts to client need, rather than unilaterally requiring that the clients adapt to the process. [17] Each party is entitled to select the participating lawyer, financial professional of his or her choice or any expert relevant to the dispute. The parties will jointly select financial professionals if needed. The lawyers’ roles are to provide a safe environment and an organized process that will assist the parties to reach mutually acceptable agreements. The lawyers help the parties to communicate with each other, identify issues, collect and interpret data, locate experts, ask questions, make observations, suggest options. They will also help the parties express their needs, goals and feelings, check the workability of the proposed solutions and prepare and file all written paperwork for the court. Although collaborative lawyers may be members of a collaborative group, each lawyer is independent from the other lawyer and has been hired by only one party in the Collaborative Process. In divorce and other family disputes, the role of the mental health professional is to assist the parties in dealing with the psychological and emotional aspects of the ending of the relationship, the divorce transition, and in preparing for the post-divorce relationship period. In addition to acting as coaches and facilitators, they can assist in creating the framework for successful parenting relationships and strategies. Collaborating Mental Health Professionals may be employed by each of the parties, any of the parties, or the parties together. The role of the financial professional is to assist parties to understand both the financial and tax ramifications of settlement decisions, which will better enable them to reach an agreement which maximizes the financial resources in a manner acceptable to each party. Financial professionals may serve in many helpful capacities: as independent managers with whom the parties contract to organize the gathering of all relevant financial information; as experts to analyze cash flow and financial records used in the determination of support; and as experts in the valuation of business interests, employment benefits and retirement assets.
Roles of Parties The parties are in charge of the process and responsible for its outcome. The essential role of the parties is to embrace the principles and guidelines of the Collaborative Process and to actively participate in the application of these principles. In so doing, the participants commit themselves to allowing each party participate effectively with autonomy, freedom and respect. Critical to achieving success is the goal that each party feels safe in the process. One’s individual protection comes from the fact that each party must give consent to every aspect of the process. Each party agrees to refrain from taking unilateral action that would directly or indirectly affect the interests of the other without express consent. The parties commit themselves to work constructively. Most importantly, it is the parties who are responsible for the resolution of the disputes and the final agreement.
Boundaries of the Collaborative Process The Collaborative Process represents an opportunity and not a guarantee. It is essential for the parties and the collaborative professionals to operate in good faith, and with honesty and integrity if the objectives of the process are to be realized by the parties. A prerequisite to realizing these objectives is the establishment of a process which each party finds safe. To that end, the parties agree to honor the personal and process boundaries of one another. These include, but are not limited to psychological, emotional, relational, and physical boundaries. It is understood that collaborative professionals may withdraw from a case as soon as possible upon learning that the other party has withheld or misrepresented information and failed to immediately correct the mistake, or otherwise acted to undermine or take unfair advantage of the Collaborative Law Process. Examples of such actions include secret disposal of property, failure to disclose assets, debts or income, taking assets out of jurisdiction, dilatory conduct of either party, abuse of minors or plans to flee with the children in a marriage dispute.
Termination of Collaborative Law Process. Either party may unilaterally and without cause terminate the Collaborative Law process by giving written notice to the other party and lawyers. The parties do not waive the right to seek assistance of the court. However, any resort to adversarial court action automatically terminates the Collaborative Law Participation Agreement signed by the parties and their Collaborative professionals. The lawyers’ representation of the parties is limited to the Collaborative Law process. No lawyer representing a party in the Collaborative Law process can represent that party in court in any proceeding against the other party subject to the collaborative process. In the event the parties choose to proceed with the adversarial method, using the procedures of the court and the legal system, both lawyers are disqualified from representing the parties and shall immediately file Notices of Withdrawal. If the lawyers have not formally appeared as the lawyers on record for the parties, they shall otherwise terminate their relationships with the participants. In the event that the Collaborative Law process terminates, all experts will be disqualified as witnesses and their work product will be inadmissible as evidence unless the parties and the collaborative experts each agree otherwise in writing. However, if the Collaborative Process is terminated, parties are likely to incur additional retainers for new lawyer and their matter may be delayed while new lawyers become familiar with our case.
Disqualification/withdraw of the Lawyer. Lawyers may withdraw at any time for any reason during the process. The withdrawal of a lawyer does not necessarily terminate the Collaborative Law process. If the lawyer for either party withdraws, the lawyer for the other party may continue to represent that participant in any ongoing negotiations or processes, so long as the matter remains outside the court system. If the party whose lawyer has withdrawn continues without a new Collaborative Lawyer, the case may continue using collaborative principles and practices. However, the case will no longer be governed by the Participation Agreement signed by all parties at the outset of the Collaborative Law matter, as the process requires two trained lawyer representing the parties to the dispute. In the event that the participant whose lawyer has withdrawn retains another trained collaborative lawyer, the parties agree to re-execute the Participation Agreement in order to have all parties governed by its terms. “Whether an attorney withdraws as a matter of right, or because of a disqualification because of a court intervention, the withdrawing attorney shall provide the participant with all pleadings, signed agreements, and any financial records which had been provided by the parties. File notes, correspondence and all communications between the parties and professionals shall remain confidential”. Parties should not expect the collaborative process to be easy going. When the going gets tough, the collaborative lawyers must stay the course and work even harder to assist the parties in finding more and better options for resolution.
Is the disqualification clause a burden on the client? The most controversial aspect of collaborative law is the disqualification clause. Critics of the collaborative law process in USA claim the disqualification agreement is actually a burden on the client. If a client decides he or she wants to terminate the collaborative law process, the client not only has to find new representation, the client also has to find all new experts to participate in the litigation process[18]. Termination will result in an increase in cost and time for the client. In addition, clients will no longer be able to work with the lawyers they invested trust and time in[19]. Therefore, in order to avoid the burdens of termination, the client could feel pressured to accept agreements that may actually not be in his or her best interest[20]. Despite the potential burdens, the disqualification agreement is a significant external incentive for the lawyers and parties to settle[21]. If the parties reach impasse in traditional negotiations, lawyers who are not barred from taking the issue to court usually decide quickly what should be done. One reason for this behavior is the financial incentive to go to court; lawyers receive more money from their clients if the clients decide to litigate because it requires more time and work. Therefore, some lawyers may push their clients into litigation in order to make extra money[22]. The disqualification clause helps to ensure that the lawyer is advocating for the client’s best interests, and not what will make the lawyer the most money[23]. If a client does not want to take a chance on agreeing to the disqualification clause, “cooperative law” is also an option. This facilitative process is similar to collaborative law because it involves four-way meetings between the clients and their respective lawyers. Procedurally, the two processes are about the same, but the major difference is the lack of the disqualification agreement. However, I wonder if the incentive to settle is really there if the lawyers and clients know they can resort to litigation at any time?[24] Will the parties really work as hard to come up with a creative solution if they know they can always go to court? The bottom line is that the risk of litigation will always be present in cooperative law. The disqualification clause creates powerful incentives to search for a reasonable solution without litigation. In the long run, working longer and making concessions in order to reach an agreement will almost always be in the best interests of both the clients and anyone whose life is affected by the relationship. The clients will walk away from the process knowing how to reasonably resolve future issues with one another. This will hopefully help prevent any subsequent legal battles between them. The disqualification clause aims to help the clients and their attorneys create a mutually beneficial settlement that will help the clients preserve a peaceful relationship.
However, there is a well founded view on the challenge of disqualification clause in collaborative practice. One author observed that “an attorney is unlikely to sign away to an adversary the ability to decide when the attorney’s representation of her client ends”[25]. That indeed few corporate lawyers would appreciate amassing time and expenses of preparing for collaborative session only to have the opposing side prematurely withdraw, leaving all other lawyers unable to continue in their representation of their clients. Secondly some lawyers are paid on contingency fee structure, thus failure to reach a settlement in the collaborative law session could leave a contingency fee lawyer without a penny for his efforts.
Thirdly, considering and recognizing that civil litigators may have fewer, more long–term relationships with their clients, disqualification agreements would threaten those relationships by allowing another lawyer or law firm to take over a client’s case, if it failed to settle. And civil litigators are likely to resist opening the door to their competition. Thus the fear of break up as a result of disqualification clauses might keep both corporate lawyers and corporate clients away from the collaborative practice. The question that calls for more enquiry is whether or not collaborative law can be wholly embraced by the corporate world with the withdraw clause? Does it call for an amendment? The debate shifts from Texas to Kampala.
Temporary Agreements. In order to provide each party with a feeling of safety and security, without which full commitment to the Collaborative Law process is impossible, some temporary agreements may be necessary and that those may even include mutual restraining agreements or orders. The parties agree to work in the collaborative process to reach those agreements to allow all parties to proceed with safety and security while permanent agreements are negotiated. If either party feels the need, temporary agreements may be entered as temporary court orders and that the filing of such temporary agreements shall not be inconsistent with the commitment to work without the intervention of the court system.
Confidentiality All discussions among the parties, notes written in conjunction with those discussions, and communications between the participants and the collaborative professionals are deemed settlement discussions and cannot be offered as evidence in any subsequent proceedings between the parties. Pleadings, financial records of the relationship, and written agreements signed during the process are not covered by the confidentiality provision and will survive the termination of the Collaborative Law process. The collaborative process will not create confidentiality for any documents which would otherwise be discoverable under Civil Procedure rules. Any documents created for the collaborative process (settlement proposals, schedules, summaries, etc.) for the purpose of facilitating settlement discussions and negotiations, shall be deemed confidential and cannot be introduced in any subsequent court proceeding without the express written consent of all parties. In signing the Collaborative Law Participation Agreement, all parties and Collaborating Professionals pledge to comply with and promote the spirit and written word of these Principles and Guidelines. These are the guidelines of the collaborative process which can be adopted visa avis our commercial court mediation rules.
How is collaborative practice different from mediation? Many mediators and collaborative law practitioners I met in USA were of the opinion that; reasons for preferring Collaborative Law are almost always described in terms of ‘doing better,’ including reducing the risk of getting a bad deal or simply giving away too much, and equalizing what they otherwise regarded as an uneven negotiation.” The collaborative lawyers explained that they believe their coaching and facilitative skills are necessary to ensure their clients’ needs are met, but in a mediation setting, the lawyers are not encouraged to use those skills. It has been said that there is some “sibling rivalry” present between mediation and collaborative law, but efforts are being made to build a better relationship between the two processes because they are important alternatives to litigation. Mediation takes the dispute out of the courtroom and aides the parties in creating their own settlement agreement. In mediation, the parties work with a neutral third party to resolve their disputes[26]. Mediation promotes good communication between the parties, and encourages the parties to create their own solutions. If mediation is already accomplishing the aims of collaborative law, why adopt an additional approach? Collaborative law practitioners are not mediators. A mediator is a neutral third-party and collaborative law practitioner is an advocate. Under the Uganda court system, especially the High Court, registrars who double as mediators since they work directly with the clients, while the lawyers are present during the mediation process, they are limited to “advising from the sidelines.”[27] Therefore, it is likely that the parties participating in mediation will go into the process alone, and the mediator will guide both parties through the settlement process. Collaborative law provides the client with an advocate during the settlement process that he or she may not have in mediation. However, Gay Cox , one of the re-known collaborative practitioners in Texas, highlights some of the challenges of collaborative practice. She states that; “The field is challenging and intellectually stimulating. The practitioner is exercising many skills-conflict resolutions, coaching, counseling, advising, speaking persuasively, listening, empathizing, being assertive, drafting, researching, etc. A four-way meeting is like an improvisational drama production where you, as one of the lawyers, are a co-director. You are always ‘on’. You learn to function as a member of a team. You learn when to let go and be silent, allowing others to take the lead. You find that you must relinquish control of and to your client. There is no virtue in being one who ‘is in control of his/her client’ (a statement often made in praise of litigators). You come to appreciate that the lawsuit belongs to the clients, not to you. It is only important that they are satisfied with the outcome. You affirm their right to do what they feel is right even if it is beyond what the law would require. The only limitation is that you will not be a party to breaking the law. With this comes the peace of mind that the burden of being primarily responsible for the outcome is lifted from your shoulders. It is the client's life and they will live with the consequences of their choices, knowing that they have an avenue-the collaborative law process-to address future disputes” [28] Unlike mediation without the assistance of lawyers, clients in Collaborative Law can have as much hand-holding as they want. They get the benefit of the lawyer's investigative and analytical skills in detecting any possible fraud as the facts are assembled. They get sound real-time advice in setting goals and skilled help in negotiating. And it all proceeds at a pace not dictated by the "hurry up and wait" demands of a court calendar, so the parties have time to reality-test each other's proposals, and to get comfortable with their deal before signing it. The main difference from litigation is that the lawyer's advocacy is focused on persuading the other party rather than a judge[29].
Is the collaborative process the right choice? Collaborative practice is an alternative dispute resolution process that has many advantages. Both clients have skilled legal advisers at every stage of the process. Both lawyers understand how to reach creative settlements. The client is never “on his/her own”; the lawyer is at the client’s side, advising and assisting the client to achieve goals by mutual participation in the process and to achieve agreement.Both clients and their lawyer agree in advance to work only towards a settlement acceptable to both clients. Thus litigation cannot be threatened. Neither party will be permitted to “play games” or take unfair or improper advantage of each other or to misuse the process. The lawyers share with their clients a financial incentive to make the collaborative process work. The lawyers have not succeeded unless they help clients create a mutually acceptable solution. As with all good faith negotiation, some compromise is required from each side. An outcome that both parties are satisfied with notwithstanding that they have compromised is a “win/win” result. The lawyers are “out of a job” if the process breaks down. Neither lawyer can go on to represent the client if the collaborative process fails. The lawyers are concerned about the process as well as the outcome. Clients and lawyers work together as the members of a settlement team, rather than working against each other as “opposing parties”. Observations by experienced collaborative professionals The disqualification agreement may not promote collaborative negotiation in some cases. A disqualification agreement is not necessary or sufficient to promote collaboration. Some Collaborative Lawyers struggle to collaborate even with a disqualification agreement and many people negotiate quite well without one. Although the disqualification agreement can be helpful, it also can create problems. Some parties will not use a process that jeopardizes their continuing relationship with their lawyer – and that effectively gives their adversary the power to fire their lawyer. The disqualification agreement also creates a risk of significant settlement pressure. After investing substantial time and money in collaborative negotiations, clients may feel stuck in the process because they feel economically or psychologically unable to hire a new lawyer to litigate when it might be in their best interest to do so. This might also be problematic where there is a culture of corporate bodies hiring attorneys on retainer basis. From the experience of attorneys who have adopted this mode of dispute resolution, dispute resolution professionals have had a hard time getting people to use an interest-based approach in negotiation, instead of a positional approach. ADR experts have provided helpful suggestions for “changing the game,” though these ideas are usually limited to case-by-case efforts within a culture of adversarial negotiation. With Uganda’s common law background and its adversarial nature, there is a likelihood of the same hiccup emerging. Virtually Collaborative Law developed and is predominately practiced in family matters, despite great efforts to promote it in other disputes, especially civil and commercial matters. There are many reasons why the disqualification agreement creates a greater barrier in civil/commercial cases than family cases. Civil cases often have more money at stake, there is often a stronger relationship between lawyers and clients, and there often are weaker reputation pressures to make sure that lawyers act collaboratively. Civil and corporate lawyers would be especially reluctant to see cases go to their competitors if they do not settle in Collaborative Law. When a lawyer is hired on contingency fee basis, a disqualification agreement creates additional problems. Also in divorce matters, it may not work in Uganda where parties should not be seen negotiating divorce or colluding with each other. It was observed at the 9th Annual IACP forum in October 2008 in New Orleans USA [30] that some large law firms in USA tend to put ADR processes on the back burner. This might be a hindrance in Uganda as well should the practice be adopted. It was observed, for example, that in a large firm in US or UK where billable hours is a main priority, the lawyers want cases that go to trial because they are guaranteed more hours. It cannot be denied that a firm will accumulate more billable hours if their lawyers spend a majority of their time litigating than if they were practicing collaborative law. Some larger firms work with big clients who believe that litigating will be more beneficial to them. If the firm were to advise this type of client to consider settling instead of litigating, the client could very easily go to another firm. Therefore, in circumstances like that, these firms will not consider using a process like Collaborative Law because they do not want to lose these important clients. In addition, some lawyers plainly do not want to use an ADR process because they enjoy representing their clients in an adversarial context. Nevertheless, my considered view is that lawyers who are skeptical about the process should realize that Collaborative Law may offer more benefits than the typical practice does. Collaborative law is unique in the sense that it is one of the only processes in which two lawyers actually work together in the same room with their respective clients, striving to reach mutual goals through an agreed process that explicitly precludes litigation. The lawyers’ relationship with one another is a positive one because for once they are able to trust one another.
Is Collaborative Practice the best option for everyone? Collaborative law is an exciting new alternative to keep strained business relations and family disputes[31] out of the courtroom. But certain aspects of the process raise some important considerations. For instance, could the disqualification agreement serve more as a burden on the client than a benefit? The question is whether or not the practice follows ethical standards; is the lawyer “zealously advocating” for his or her client and can we be sure a client has given actual informed consent to participate in the process? Others have suggested that mediation is a sufficient process, so collaborative law is not necessary. Collaborative law may not be for everyone. In family matters, for example, collaborative law is probably not the appropriate process for a family violence victim to settle a divorce. In that situation, the decision of a judge would most likely afford that type of individual more appropriate protection and remedies. Sometimes people involved in a dispute need a judicial determination of a preliminary question of law or fact before they can proceed with any type of negotiation. This is not a problem; these individuals can agree to participate in collaborative law afterwards. Secondly, Collaborative law is not for people who want revenge on their former spouse or business partner. If a client is vengeful, the process will most likely be ineffective because this client is not focused on collaboration or resolution of the dispute. Collaborative law practitioners recognize that initially a client may demonstrate feelings of animosity towards the other party, but after a lengthy initial consultation, a trained collaborative lawyer should be able to decipher if the client would be an appropriate candidate for the process. Overall, if the parties place a high value on reaching an agreement and avoiding the adversarial pressures of contested litigation, Collaborative Practice would be an appropriate choice as a dispute resolution process. Sometimes you will meet someone who is just determined to have their day in court, and you will know immediately that collaborative law is not for them. But when people realize it does not have to be knives at dawn, it might be the option for them[32].Further, while it is accurate to say collaborative law may not be right for everyone, it is for most people.
Questions to ponder about One of the questions that have bothered me in the research for this paper concerns the ability or inability of the facilitation process to enforce agreements without use of the law. If two parties agree to resolve their dispute without using the process of adjudication, and if they come to an agreed upon settlement, who will enforce it if there is no legal document? Unfortunately, the days are gone where 'men of honor' would settle with the handshake or in front of one witness[33]. So if the ground on which the concept of law has grown up is accountability, who will hold these two parties accountable? What if the settlement was wrong or broke some constitutional or criminal law? There may be honor among thieves but is this the appropriate justice or the pursuit of truth that facilitation and adjudication value? I have pondered over other questions: Can the legal system make more room for alternative styles of conflict resolution? Will lawyers and judges embrace the validity of alternative dispute resolution with the same tepidness that nurses and doctors had for alternative medicine years ago? Is it inevitable that facilitation and its varied approaches to managing conflict has so impacted the legal system that there is no turning back? What about the development of public laws and issues of morality? Can facilitation handle the complexity of law making? Why is law so complex in the first place? These questions are still unanswered in my mind. However, reading several court cases where the only justice done is a financial gain and the only truth sought is who is to blame or who the winner is, I am looking for something better than just the legal system. One further question leads into my conclusion: Does spirituality or religious norms play a role in the adjudication or facilitation processes of dealing with conflict? A great friend of mine, my trainer, a lawyer and collaborative professional, Gay Cox, sent me a message about the speech she gave at the State Bar Spring Conference in USA in March 2009. It sums up spirituality and conflict resolution; “I quoted Jesus' words in Matt. 5:25-26 [34]and ended with "So, if you were going to be dedicated to a cause what better cause than transforming the way the world resolves conflict. In my spirituality, this would be what it means to be in the Image of the Divine, to be a peacemaker and thus be called a child of God." This is synonymous with what the Principal Judge in Uganda, Justice James Ogoola, stated at the Symposium, “Come Let Us Reason Together”[35], organized at Hotel Africana on 18th April 2009, where a lawyer is seen as a peacemaker rather than an a fighter.
Mind Shift Lawyers interested in the Collaborative Process must be trained and, to be effective, must experience what is referred to as a “paradigm shift.” Making the paradigm shift requires 180° shift in thinking from litigation to Collaboration. One example of a shift in the lawyers’ behavior is the lack of reliance on the law to dictate the outcome of the dispute. Clients are privately advised of their legal rights, but discussions about the law are replaced with discussions regarding the interests and goals of the parties in the face-to-face meetings. Constant references to the law will only serve to stifle or limit creative thinking. Parties may resolve their disputes in any manner that they agree on so long as the solutions are not illegal or against public policy. Some parties and lawyers will find it difficult, if not impossible, to agree to voluntary disclosure of all relevant information. Some lawyers will protest that their clients will object to their withdrawal if the case does not settle. People with these attitudes probably do not belong to the Collaborative Process. The Collaborative Process is a many faceted opportunity to avoid and to settle disputes. By using the process in drafting agreements, parties are able to anticipate and prevent many pitfalls that could later result in expensive conflicts. Areas of the law which can benefit parties by early use of the process to negotiate legal documents include, but are not limited to, construction contracts, partnership agreements, pre and post nuptial agreements, buy-sell agreements, estate planning documents, and employment contracts, mortgage contracts, land disputes and international trade contracts. Parties having disputes in practically any area of the law and are willing to go forward honestly and in good faith can take advantage of the collaborative opportunity to settle their disputes privately and remain in charge of scheduling and costs. While litigation destroys ongoing relationships, the Collaborative Process can be a bridge to a redefined relationship between the parties and, in addition, act as a model to resolve future disputes. Disputes belong to clients not their lawyers. Consequently, clients should have the opportunity to choose how they want to resolve their disputes. Future of Collaborative law World wide Business executives and professionals are beginning to realize that costly and time consuming litigation does not need to be the first option for resolving disputes, especially with the recent global economic recession. Light bulbs are starting to light up in law firms and corporate executives’ offices only that it takes a shape of cost-cutting in the form of cutting down fee notes. But would this stop disputes from arising? The Collaborative Practice may be the business imperative of our time. Interest-based negotiation, as opposed to positional bargaining, really captures the exponential power of cooperation. Working together in a non-adversarial manner to meet the goals and interests of the parties is a quick, inexpensive way to resolve disputes quickly, control costs and scheduling, control outcomes, maintain relations, avoid unnecessary publicity, which is rarely possible in litigation. We must be alive to Clark’s Law of Revolutionary of Ideas. Every revolutionary idea—in science, politics, art, law or whatever, evokes three stages of reaction. They may be summed up in three phrases (1) it is impossible, so don’t waste my time with it. (2) It is possible, but it is not worth doing. (3) I said it was a good idea all along. The collaborative process has been welcomed in different parts of the globe and many law firms in USA, Australia, Ireland and United Kingdom. It has become part of the practice and litigation has been dropped in favor of the collaborative process. That belief gives us assurance that the future of collaborative law is bright. The satisfaction of the Collaborative Law clients will ensure its recognition as a credible process. In turn, the satisfaction of the clients will be a kind of reward to the collaborative law practitioners who will be motivated to continue advocating for it. Therefore, with support, promotion, and effective practice by its advocates, Collaborative Law will no longer just have potential. It will become a main method to remove clients from the war zone of litigation and into a peaceful venue of conflict resolution. Many scholars and practitioners I have met from different jurisdictions believe collaborative law is an innovative new ADR process that should be utilized as the primary means for resolving disputes. In order for this to happen, there must be more effort by legal and professional communities to promote the growth of the collaborative law movement.
Conclusion. For collaborative law to become a novel idea in Uganda, it will probably take some time. But we cannot ignore the global movement towards such methods of dispute resolution that would best serve our clients’ interests. Mediation often supervised by courts has already taken root. Practicing Collaborative Law requires judgment to see which case is best suited to the practice because not all cases can be handled under Collaborative Practice. I hope this is an idea that can form part of our practice. The Collaborative Law process definitely has its own place in ADR, and its successes will help in promoting the Collaborative Law movement. I know one day it will be like what Stu Webb experienced, “I will no longer go to court” in any practicing lawyer’s life. For lawyers, it is not only a question of reshaping the legal institution to make it more accessible to clients, more personal, and more under client control. The legal profession is itself stumbling under enormous pressures. Competition is increasing, job satisfaction is decreasing. I share the views of Nancy Cameron, the incumbent president of IACP; lawyers have a tremendous amount of control over the evolutionary spiral of the legal institution[36]. We are skilled in debate and critique. We can choose to direct these skills to snipe at change and maintain the status quo. Or we can initiate a deeper dialogue about the interface between the legal profession and peoples’ lives. We can speak to each other about the destruction of professional blind spots, and how to promote a broader vision within the legal community. We can decide how we wish to live our professional lives. And we can act on our intentions. Yes, we can! It is my humble prayer that we can expand our professional dialogue to be more inclusive of the differing needs of the public and profession, and we can drive the evolution of the legal institution to respond to the challenges of our place in history. As peacemakers we will deserve a place in history. ends [1]LLB (Hons) (UCU), Dip. L.P (LDC), Assistant-Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Uganda Christian University, Legal Associate, Ligomarc Advocates. Arinaitwe is a member of International Academy of Collaborative Professionals (IACP) Texas, USA, and Uganda Christian Lawyers Fraternity. He is also trained in Interest-Based Negotiation and Collaborative Practice. He is biased towards Commercial and corporate law practice. [2]Sherrie R. Abney “Avoiding Litigation, A Guide to Civil Collaborative Law” Trafford Publishing Co. Canada(2005) p. 10 I am highly indebted to Sherrie R. Abney, Gay Cox and Linda Solomon who allowed me to use their materials in this article and in the dissemination of information about Collaborative practice. And to all those who sponsored my training on the 9th Annual Educational and Networking Forum of IACP in October 2008 in New Orleans , USA. [3]Sherrie R. Abney “Avoiding Litigation, A Guide to Civil Collaborative Law” Trafford Publishing Co. Canada (2005) p. 10. [4]Sherrie R Abney, A New Way of Doing Business: Collaboration. This article is available on www.collaborativelaw.us [5] Sherrie R Abney, The rebirth of common Sense: Collaborative Law, available at www.adr-attorneys.com [6] Nancy Cameron, Collaborative Practice: Deepening the Dialogue, The Continuing Legal Education of British Columbia, Vancouver (2004),. P.4 [7] Robert Wildau, Making Sense of Collaborative law(2001) (unpublished). [8] In an interview with Ms. Jackie Kamua, a practicing Advocate in Nairobi, Kenya who expressed concern on how slow Kenya’s legal System is in embracing Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms. [9]It must be said that the nature of training at Law Development Centre has been more adversarial, emphasizing litigation more than any other way of disputer resolution mechanisms. [10]I met Stu Webb in New Orleans, Louisiana, USA at the 9th Networking and Educational Forum for collaborative lawyers. A humble brilliant man. [11]Lorraine Lopich, Collaborative Practice: Law without Litigation, Mediation without Advice and more’ (2007),(unpublished) p1. [12] Lawrence R Maxwell Jr, The Development of Collaborative Law. (2007). Available at; www.collaborativelaw.us. Lawrence is the founding director and President of the Texas Collaborative Council. [13] Nancy Cameron, Collaborative Practice: Deepening the Dialogue, The Continuing Legal Education of British Columbia, Vancouver (2004). P.2 [14] Gary G Cox, Janet Brumley, and their colleagues came and conducted a workshop at Uganda Christian university where practicing lawyers, law lecturers and selected number of students were taken through a three day workshop in October 2007. The author continued to attend training in New Orleans USA. [15] Collaborative law is centered on interest –based negotiation. Client-centered means there is recognition that the creation of a non-threatening, non-hostile environment is only a first step, not an end in itself. It means that, after identifying the most important shared goals of the parties—those objectives that unite their interests. The process and its strategic application will consistently, constructively and steadfastly work to allow the clients to achieve those goals [16] This section contains a substantial part of Sherrie R. Abney’s article The Rebirth of Common Sense: Collaborative Law used with her permission. [17] Chip Rose, The Client-Centered Process: common Grounds for Mediators and Collaborative Professionals (2003) (unpublished). [18] John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss, 42 FAM. CT. (2004), pp. 282-283. If the Collaborative Law process breaks down, the clients remain responsible for paying their respective collaborative lawyers for time spent on the case, and they are then faced with the problem of advancing another retainer for a new attorney. [19] ibid [20] Joshua Isaacs, A New Way to Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding Collaborative Law, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS , (2005), 838. [21] Pauline H. Tesler; Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. (2004), p. 320 [22] Lande & Herman, supra note 5, at 283 [23] Zachary Z. Annable, Beyond the Thunderdome--The Search for a New Paradigm of Modern Dispute Resolution: The Advent of Collaborative Lawyering and Its Conformity with the Modern Rules of Professional Conduct, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. (2005), p.160. The disqualification agreement helps eliminate threats, tactical delays, and hidden agendas so the parties can be integrative and focus on achieving “win-win” situations instead of resorting to positional bargaining [24] Advocates of collaborative law claim the lack of the disqualification agreement gives no guarantee that the party is committed to avoid litigation, so essentially it is no different than traditional negotiations. [25] Kayle R Bahr, A Non Extreme Make Over: Altering the Disqualification Agreement to Increase Collaborative Law’s Attractiveness to Small Business Clients [26] Gay. G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. (2004), 45, 45-46 [27] John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. (2003), p. 1325(explaining that even if lawyers are allowed to be involved in the mediation process, they are very adversarial and not as focused on settlement as a collaborative law practitioner would be) [28] Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The Case for Collaborative Law, 11 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev(2004). 45 . [29] Robert Wildua: Making Sense of Collaborative Law (unpublished) [30] I was privileged to attend the 9th Annual Educational and Networking forum of IACP members world wide from 14th to 19th October 2008 at Sheraton Hotel New Orleans Louisiana, USA. Where remarkable speakers shared their experiences on in collaborative practice and churning the way forward. [31] This applies to jurisdictions that allow consent and out of court settlements in divorce matters. [32] Siobhan Cronin, “Separating Couples: I Wont See you in Court” (Collaborative Connection) Vol. 5(3) June 2009. Published on IACP Website, Monday 20 April 2009; www.collaborativepractice.com. [33] Quoted from; Alan Simpson, The Role of Law in conflict Management [34] Mathew 5 25-26 states that (English Standard Version) “ 25 Come to terms quickly with your accuser while you are going with him to court, lest your accuser hand you over to the judge, and the judge to the guard, and you be put in prison. 26Truly, I say to you, you will never get out until you have paid the last penny” [35] Quoted from the Bible Isaiah 1: 18 [36] “It takes a lot of courage to release the familiar and seemingly secure, to embrace the new. But there is no real security in what is no longer meaningful. There is more security in the adventurous and exciting, for in movement there is life, and in change there is power”. Alan Cohen